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CONVICTIONS UNDER SECTION 666 AND REQUIRING PROOF OF A QUID PRO QUO
I. INTRODUCTION
Leona Beldini, once the Deputy Mayor of Jersey City, now faces up to three years in
prison for federal program bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666.1 Beldini was one of forty-six
people arrested in a 2009 Federal Bureau of Investigation corruption sting – the largest sting of
this kind in New Jersey history.2 With corruption present in all levels of the government, it has
become imperative for prosecutors to find effective ways to utilize federal bribery statutes in
order to bring public officials who engage in these types of activities to justice. One of the
important tools available to prosecutors in achieving this objective is § 666.
In her official capacity, Beldini reported directly to Jersey City Mayor Jerramiah Healy.3
Solomon Dwek, using the name David Esenbach, posed as a real estate developer with the
objective of bribing Mayor Healy to expedite his fictitious real estate development plans. 4
Beldini facilitated the meetings between Dwek and Healy, and received money from Dwek
including two checks for $10,000 in exchange for alleged official assistance with the
development plans.5 Among the evidence gathered against Beldini were her statements that she
could “definitely help [Dwek] get through a lot of red tape,”6 an agreement on her part to refrain
from putting Dwek’s name on any documents in order to conceal his involvement,7 and a
reassurance she made to Dwek that “Jerramiah Healy remembers his friends.”8 On February 11,

1

Joe Ryan, Former Jersey City Deputy Mayor Leona Beldini gets Three Years in Prison, THE STAR LEDGER, (June
14, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/former_jersey_city_deputy_mayo_1.html.
2
Jason Grant, U.S. Appeals Court Denies Former Jersey City Deputy Mayor Leona Beldini's Conviction Appeal,
THE STAR LEDGER (Sep. 6, 2011).
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/us_appeals_court_denies_former.html.
3
United States v. Beldini, 2011 WL 3890964, at *1.
4
Id.
5
Id. at *2.
6
Id. (citing Appellee’s Br. at 11).
7
Id. at *3 (citing Appellee’s Br. at 14).
8
Beldini, 2011 WL 3890964, at *3.
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2010, a jury convicted Beldini of two counts of bribery.9 Beldini appealed the conviction on
several grounds, including the claim that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that
a quid pro quo is required by 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(b).10 The Third Circuit affirmed the
conviction and refrained from requiring that a quid pro quo be proven in order for Beldini’s
bribery conviction to stand.11
A quid pro quo, Latin for “something for something,”12 requires a specific intent to give
or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.13 A significant split in the federal
circuit courts has developed concerning whether a conviction under § 666 requires proof of a
quid pro quo. In certain cases, the ability to convict officials may very well turn on whether or
not the prosecutor must prove to the jury that such an exchange occurred. If a quid pro quo
requirement existed and the jury had been so instructed, would the jury still have convicted
Beldini of two counts of bribery under § 666? Courts on one side of the split would likely hold
that Beldini’s bribery conviction requires some proof of a quid pro quo.14 In contrast, courts on
the other side of the split would likely agree with the Third Circuit’s holding that Beldini’s
conviction does not require this type of proof.15 While the Supreme Court has held that a quid

9

Id.
Id.
11
Id. at *8.
12
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“An action or thing that is exchanged for another action or thing of
more or less equal value; a substitute”).
13
12 AM. JUR. 2D Bribery § 6 (2011) (citing United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 1329, 170 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2008); United States v. Quinn,
359 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2004)); See also Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery:
Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (1992) (“a quid pro quo
occurs when an official allows her official decisions to be influenced by the receipt of a payment”).
14
See United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a conviction under § 666 required the
jury to find that the defendant engaged in a specific quid pro quo); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that the quid pro quo need not be specific or identifiable at the time of the exchange in order to
convict a defendant for bribery under the statute).
15
See United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a conviction under § 666 did not require
proof of a quid pro quo); United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that identification of a quid pro
quo was not necessary for conviction under § 666, and that the jury’s finding of corrupt intent was sufficient);
United States v. Zimmerman, 509 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that it was unnecessary to prove a quid pro quo
10
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pro quo is necessary for convictions under both the Hobbs Act16 and 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A),17
the Court has yet to address whether analogous reasoning requires proof of quid pro quo to
convict under § 666.
Section 666 has a broad jurisdictional trigger: it applies as long as the state or local
government has received $10,000 in federal program funding and the bribery-induced theft or
transaction is more than $5,000.18 However, the courts have disagreed whether the statute and its
application should be interpreted narrowly or broadly. A narrow interpretation would include a
quid pro quo requirement and suggest that a quid pro quo is inherently inferred by the statute’s
language and legislative intent.19 A broader interpretation, conversely, would refrain from
adopting a quid pro quo in its entirety. For reasons related to congressional intent and public
policy, the best solution would require prosecutors and juries to identify an implicit quid pro quo
in order to convict individuals under § 666.
This Note explores the current split in the circuit courts regarding whether § 666 contains
a quid pro quo requirement and takes the position that injecting an implicit quid pro quo
of any kind in order to convict an individual for receiving bribes under the statute); United States v. McNair, 605
F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the statute did not impose a specific quid pro quo requirement).
16
See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272–73 (1991) (The Court emphasized that a conviction of an
official “under color of official right” would occur “only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise
or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.” The Supreme Court has also only applied
the quid pro quo requirement in those situations where campaign contributions are issue in Hobbs Act prosecutions).
17
See United States v. Sun–Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 406 (1999) (holding that the illegal
gratuity statute required a quid pro quo because the § 201 (c)(1)(A) prohibition on gratuities given “for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed” seemed “pregnant with the requirement that some particular official
act be identified and proved”).
18
Paul Salvatoriello, Note, The Practical Necessity of Federal Intervention Versus the Ideal of Federalism: An
Expansive View of Section 666 in the Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 89 GEO. L. J. 2393, 2401 (2001);
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2010)); See Elahna S. Weinflash, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) Pertaining to Bribery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds, 5 A.L.R. FED. 2d 571
(2005) (“Despite being a criminal statute, courts have generally interpreted 18 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(2) broadly as to
the prohibited conduct and the organizations covered, to cast a wide umbrella to protect federal funds.”).
19
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784, 824
(1985) (Lowenstein suggests that under the narrowest reading of “the intent to influence” element, a defendant must
have had intent to form an agreement, but the agreement did not necessarily have to be explicit and did not have to
relate to any particular official act. So while a narrow reading of the statute would include the quid pro quo
requirement in general, Lowenstein suggests that the narrowest reading would encompass a more implicit
requirement.).
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requirement into the statute is in accordance with congressional intent, and is desirable for
reasons of public policy. Part II of this Note explores the role of the quid pro quo and the
different choices available for expressing a quid pro quo. Part III of this Note compares similar
federal statutes that, on their face, do not require a quid pro quo. Part IV discusses the current
circuit split and the reasoning behind the courts’ decisions whether to require proof of a quid pro
quo under § 666. Lastly, Part V concludes that the adoption of a quid pro quo requirement is
desirable, but that proof of such a quid pro quo need not be explicit.

II. A QUID PRO QUO: EXPLICIT, IMPLICIT, OR NON-EXISTENT
The law of bribery is neither “precise,” “consistent,” nor “clear cut.”20 Successful
convictions for bribery depend on the prosecutor’s ability to prove the individual’s motivation,
but because motivation can be difficult to prove, bribery is also difficult to prove.21 The quid pro
quo, or agreement between parties to exchange a benefit in return for an official act, is an
essential element of bribery.22 There are options available to the circuits and to the Supreme
Court if certiorari were to be granted on this issue, regarding how the quid pro quo can be
interpreted. The Court could choose to require prosecutors and juries to identify an explicit quid
pro quo, an implicit quid pro quo, or no quid pro quo at all. The issue facing the courts is
essentially twofold: should a quid pro quo requirement be read into the statute, and if so, must
the requirement be explicit in nature or can it be implied from the dealings at issue?
James Lindgren, a law professor and noted scholar in the area of extortion, defined
bribery as “a corrupt benefit given or received to influence official action so as to afford the
20

Id. at 801.
Robert Sherrill, Bribes, GRAND STREET Vol. 4, No. 4, 140, 145 (1985).
22
Lowenstein, supra note 19, at 819 (noting that “Bribery often is assumed to require a quid pro quo, an agreement
that in exchange for such and such a benefit, the official will perform (or omit) such and such an official act in the
desired manner.”).
21
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giver better than fair treatment.”23 A classic quid pro quo deal between a public official and a
briber is often easily recognized and prosecuted, but certain situations are inevitably unclear.24 It
is “notoriously difficult” to separate bribery from gifts, tips, legitimate campaign contributions,
and log-rolling.25 An explicit quid pro quo requires the fact-finder to identify a specific
exchange between individuals, something analogous to the holding in McCormick v. United
States whereby extortion could be proven “only if the payments are made in return for an explicit
promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”26 An implicit
quid pro quo, however, does not require the fact-finder to pinpoint a specific promise or official
act between the parties. With an implicit requirement, a jury could infer from the actions and
behavior of the defendant whether he or she engaged in illegal activity with another, even if
evidence of an express conversation was not available. Both the adoption of a quid pro quo, and
the distinction between an explicit and an implicit proof, would change the way in which the
statute is used and affect its reach in prosecuting corrupt behavior.
The Supreme Court has not adopted the terms explicit or implicit, but it has provided a
framework in which to understand what evidence each type of proof would encompass. The
Court, in its analysis regarding similar federal bribery statutes, referred to the level of proof as
either specific or implied. We can look to other federal statutes to help determine legislative

23

James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery–Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1695, 1700 (1993) (Lindgren goes on to say that bribery is usually thought to consist of paying for better than fair
treatment, and that “both the person giving and the person receiving the benefit are guilty of bribery”); see Rex v.
Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 311 (K.B. 1769) (Mansfield, L.) (“Wherever it is a crime to take, it is a crime to give:
they are reciprocal.”).
24
Anthony A. Joseph, Public Corruption: The Government’s Expansive View in Pursuit of Local and State Officials,
38 CUMB. L. REV. 567, 579 (2008) (Examples of unclear situations may include those times when a “person makes
an honest campaign contribution without receiving an immediate appointment…or immediate support for favorable
legislation, but the contribution is made to “plant a seed” with the recipient,” or when “an invitation is extended to a
public official for an out-of-town hunting trip or sporting event or when an expensive Christmas or birthday gift is
given to the public official.”).
25
Lindgren, supra note 23, at 1707.
26
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273.
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intent, and the way in which the Supreme Court has previously analyzed the quid pro quo
element.

III. A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTES
Section 666, entitled Theft or Bribery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds,
is but one of several federal bribery statutes used to curtail public corruption and ensure that
individuals who either solicit or accept bribes in violation of those statutes are brought to
justice.27 While the general objective of all of these statutes is similar in nature, each has been
crafted with a relatively specific purpose in mind. With respect to the application of a quid pro
quo requirement in each of these statutes, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue as it
pertains to 18 U.S.C § 20128 and the Hobbs Act.29 Section 666 is different from § 201 and the
Hobbs Act in both its language and its scope, but similar in its aim, and the Supreme Court has
yet to decide whether or not the prosecution must prove a quid pro quo to satisfy a conviction
under the statute.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 201: SUN–DIAMOND AND PROOF OF A QUID PRO QUO
Section 201 of Title 18 of the United States Code, titled Bribery of Public Officials and
Witnesses, provides that it is a federal crime to corruptly give, offer, or promise anything of
value to any public official.30 This statute prohibits two types of payments to federal officials:
bribes and illegal gratuities.31 The determination of whether a payment constitutes a bribe or an
illegal gratuity depends on the intent of the payor.32 A bribe requires that the payment be made

27

18 U.S.C. § 666 (2011).
See Sun–Diamond, 526 U.S. at 398.
29
See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 257.
30
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2011).
31
Id.
32
Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1013.
28
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or promised “corruptly,” whereas an illegal gratuity is a payment made to an official concerning
a specific official act, or omission, that the payor expected to occur in any event (and where
corrupt intent to influence official behavior is not required).33 This statute is primarily concerned
with criminalizing corrupt conduct where public officials are involved in accepting bribes to
further official acts.
The courts have treated bribes and illegal gratuities differently. The ability to convict an
individual or public official under § 201 for bribery requires proof of a quid pro quo. The
Supreme Court held that in order to establish a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A),34 the
government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a
specific official act for which it was given.35 The distinction between the bribe and illegal
gratuity plays a role here in that only the bribe requires a quid pro quo, defined by the Court as a
specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.36 The Court
in Sun–Diamond found that the insistence upon an “official act” within the text of the statute
where this language was so carefully defined seems “pregnant with the requirement that some
particular official act be identified and proved.”37 Aside from its decision that this type of
interpretation exemplifies the more natural meaning of the language in § 201(c)(1)(A), the Court
was persuaded to require proof of a quid pro quo because of the “peculiar results” that an

Id. See United States v. Griffin, 154 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The core difference between a bribe and a
gratuity is…the quid pro quo, or the agreement to exchange cash for official action.”); See also Lowenstein, supra
note 18, at 797 (1985) (comparing the elements of an unlawful gratuity offense with bribery: “The requirement that
there be a public official is substantially the same. A transaction involving a former official, however, can be an
unlawful gratuity but not a bribe. This is because a bribe must be made in contemplation of a future official act,
whereas an unlawful gratuity may be made in contemplation of an act in the future or the past.”).
34
18 U.S.C § 201(c)(1)(a) (Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty,
directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or
person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official.).
35
Sun–Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414.
36
Id. at 404–05.
37
Id. at 406.
33
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alternative reading of the statute would produce.38 In essence, under an alternative reading, the
individual who gives gifts or the public official who receives them, would violate the statute and
face potential prosecution.39
B. THE HOBBS ACT AND A QUID PRO QUO: REQUIRED BUT SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery or
extortion.40 Extortion is defined in the Act as the “obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color
of official right.”41 These provisions were enacted as part of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934
and remained unchanged in the Hobbs Act of 1948.42 Yet it was not until 1972 that any court
applied the Act to bribery.43 Originally, extortion convictions of individuals who had received
property depended upon a showing of actual or threatened force or fear, but courts later began to
accept the notion that public officials could violate the statute without employing either.44 The
Supreme Court has since acknowledged that the statute applies to the acceptance of bribes by
public officials,45 and the Hobbs Act has become another successful tool for prosecutors in
battling public corruption and bribery.
The Supreme Court held in McCormick v. United States46 that proof of a quid pro quo is
necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act, but only in certain situations. If payments

38

Id. At 406–07 (noting that such a reading would criminalize, for example, token gifts to the President based on his
official position or a high school principal’s gift of a school baseball cap to the Secretary of Education by reason of
his office).
39
Id. at 408.
40
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2011).
41
18 U.S.C. §1951(a), (b)(2); See also Lindgren, supra note 23, at 1696 (Extortion under color of official right can
be defined as “the seeking or receipt of a corrupt payment by a public official (or a pretended public official)
because of his office or his ability to influence official action.”).
42
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43
Id. at 278 (Scalia, J., concurring); See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972).
44
Peter D. Hardy, Note, The Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Public Corruption Prosecutions
Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 409, 411 (1995).
45
Id. at 411–12 (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)).
46
500 U.S. at 257.
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constitute campaign contributions, such proof is necessary.47 The government is required to
prove that the public official performed or refrained from performing an official duty in return
for the payment of campaign funds.48 The Court emphasized that “the receipt of such
contributions is…vulnerable under the Act as having been taken under color of official right, but
only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to
perform or not to perform an official act.”49 Furthermore, a specific quid pro quo is necessary,
not just a general expectation of a benefit.50 While the Court made it clear that a quid pro quo
was necessary for a conviction under the Hobbs Act in those instances where campaign
contributions were involved, it is unclear whether this requirement applies to all Hobbs Act
prosecutions, including those that do not involve campaign contributions.
The Court again addressed the issue of whether a quid pro quo is required to convict
individuals under the Hobbs Act in Evans v. United States.51 There the Court declined to limit
the Act further and held that an official can commit extortion under color of official right without
having “induced” payments from another.52 While the Court again found that proof of a quid pro
quo is required in cases where campaign contributions are at issue, the opinion suggests that the
requirement is not as stringent as McCormick might indicate.53 The agreement in Evans was
required to concern a specific official act, but it did not have to be explicit. An agreement could
be implied from an official’s words or actions.54 Despite this slight departure, the quid pro quo
requirement for campaign contribution cases prosecuted under the Hobbs Act remained intact.

47

Id. at 274.
Id.
49
Id. at 273.
50
Id.
51
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
52
504 U.S. at 265–66.
53
Hardy, supra note 44, at 423.
54
Ilissa B. Gold, Note, Explicit, Express, and Everything in Between: The Quid Pro Quo Requirement for Bribery
and Hobbs Act Prosecutions in the 2000’s, 36 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 261, 282 (2011).
48
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In a post Evans world, the identification of a quid pro quo is required in order to convict
an individual under the Hobbs Act for extortion whenever campaign contributions are at issue. It
is unclear whether this type of proof is an explicit or an implicit one, and it is undecided as to
whether this requirement applies to other prosecutions under the Hobbs Act.55 In spite of the
conflicting interpretations that have arisen as a result of the holdings in McCormick and Evans,
there is at least some Supreme Court guidance in determining the requirements for conviction
under § 201 and the Hobbs Act. There is even less direction, however, as to whether a quid pro
quo is required for convictions under § 666.
C. SECTION 666: A SUPPLEMENTAL TOOL IN COMBATING PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Section 666 provides that it is a federal crime to embezzle, steal, or obtain by fraud
property worth $5,000 or more from an organization that “receives, in any one year period,
benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, subsidy, loan,
guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.”56 The statute also makes it a crime to
corruptly give, solicit, or accept bribes “in connection with any business transaction, or series of
transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000
or more.”57 In enacting the statute as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Congress intended to “augment the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of
theft, fraud, and bribery involving federal monies that are disbursed to private organizations or
State and local governments pursuant to a federal program.”58

See Id. at 271 (“The circuits that have confronted public official extortion cases since Evans…have been left to
reconcile the requirement of explicitness in a quid pro quo agreement from McCormick with Justice Kennedy’s
argument that a quid pro quo need not be express.”).
56
18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2011).
57
Id. § 666(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
58
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510.
55
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This statute seems to expand upon the already existing federal bribery statutes by
increasing the federal government’s reach in prosecuting corruption in state and local
governments that receive federal money. Aside from expanding upon the Hobbs Act and § 201,
§ 666 could be viewed as a possible response to their inadequacies. The statute as a whole
avoids the problems of its predecessors by eliminating the government’s burden of establishing a
link between the stolen property or the bribed official and the federal government.59 Although §
201(b) requires that a bribe be given or received to influence an “official act” or “in return for an
official act,” § 666 sweeps more broadly than either § 201(b) or (c) because it requires only that
money be given with the intent to influence or reward a government agent “in connection with
any business, transaction, or series of transactions.”60 The differences between these two statutes
centers on the language: namely an “official act” compared with “any business, transaction, or
series of transactions” and “in return for” or “because of” compared with “in connection with.”
Additionally, the relevance of the $5,000 threshold is to avoid prosecutions for minor kickbacks
and limit violations to cases of significant or outright corruption.61 Since its creation, § 666 has
become a significant tool in combating bribery in connection with federal funds.

IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: REQUIRING PROOF A QUID PRO QUO FOR CONVICTIONS UNDER § 666
The quid pro quo requirement, as it pertains to § 666, has been the subject of bribery suits
in multiple federal circuit courts and has also resulted in a circuit split.62 Defendants in these
cases have been prosecuted under § 666(a)(1)(B) or § 666(a)(2), but the same operative language
has been applied to both subsections. Currently, the Second and Fourth Circuits have held that

59

Salvatoriello, supra note 18, at 2397.
McNair, 605 F.3d at 1191(emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) & (a)(2)).
61
Abbey, 560 F.3d at 522.
62
Beldini, 2011 WL 3890964, at *7.
60
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bribery convictions under § 666 require proof of a quid pro quo, yet they differ on the level of
specificity required to prove the exchange.63 Conversely, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits have deemed it unnecessary to prove a quid pro quo in any capacity in order to
convict an individual of soliciting or accepting bribes in violation of § 666.64
A. THE SECOND AND FOURTH CIRCUITS: INJECTING A QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT INTO § 666
In United States v. Jennings,65 the Fourth Circuit held that a jury must find a specific quid
pro quo in order to convict an individual of violating § 666.66 A jury found Larry Jennings Sr., a
housing repair contractor, guilty of three counts of violating § 666 after he made cash payments
to Charles Morris, the administrator of the Vacancy Special Funding Program (“VSFP”) in order
to secure contractor positions in housing unit renovations.67 Jennings paid cash to Morris on five
separate occasions. After the initial payment, VSFP contracts and payment checks regularly
flowed from the company Morris worked for to Jennings’s companies.68 Morris admitted to
accepting cash from Jennings, but unsuccessfully argued that he took gifts, not bribes.69 The
court labeled Jennings’s intent sufficiently corrupt to constitute his payments as “bribes” and
upheld Jennings’s conviction because “the evidence was sufficient to prove that he intended to
influence Morris’s official acts by paying him money, that is, Jennings intended to engage in a
quid pro quo.”70
According to the Fourth Circuit, a court instructing a jury on § 666(a)(2) must define the
“corrupt intent” element in the same way as it would if instructing on § 201(b), i.e., only if it
finds that an individual intended to exchange a payment for some relatively specific official act
63

See Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1006; Ganim, 510 F.3d at 134.
See Abbey, 560 F.3d at 513; Gee, 432 F.3d at 713; Zimmerman, 509 F.3d at 920; McNair, 605 F.3d at 1152.
65
Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1006.
66
Id. at 1019.
67
Id. at 1011.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1012.
70
Id. at 1015.
64
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or course of action.71 The jury must be instructed that “corrupt intent” includes a quid pro quo
requirement; otherwise the instructed definition of “corrupt intent,” an essential element of
bribery, would be erroneous.72
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Jennings, the Second Circuit has also held that a
quid pro quo requirement exists, but it has refrained from applying the same degree of
explicitness.73 Joseph Ganim served as the mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut from 1991 through
2003.74 He was convicted under § 666 for receiving bribes despite his claim that the cash, meals,
clothing, wine and other gifts he received were given out of friendship or legitimate lobbying
activity.75 The Second Circuit held that, as long as the jury found that an official or agent
accepted gifts in exchange for a promise to perform official acts for the giver, it was not
necessary to identify the specific act to be performed at the time of the promise or to link each
specific benefit to a single official act.76 The reasoning for this holding lies in the reality that
ongoing schemes such as the one present in Ganim are no less “extortionate” simply because
payments are set up as an exchange for specific official acts as the opportunities to commit those
acts arises:77 “[a] reading of the statute that excluded such schemes would legalize some of the
most pervasive and entrenched corruption [and] cannot be what Congress intended.”78 A jury is
required only to find that a particular payment was made in exchange for a commitment to
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perform beneficial official acts in the future.79 The court recognized that while particular bribes
will frequently be linked to particular official acts at the time a corrupt agreement is made, this
will not always be the case. It is therefore important to relax the quid pro quo requirement in
order for § 666 to cover even those violations where a specifically linked quid pro quo is not
before the jury.80
In sum, the Second and Fourth Circuits have held that bribery convictions under § 666
require some proof of a quid pro quo, although those requirements differ in the specificity of the
quid pro quo agreement. The Fourth Circuit requires a finding of a relatively specific quid pro
quo,81 while the Second Circuit has held that the beneficial act need not be specific or even
identifiable at the time of the exchange.82
B. THE SIXTH, SEVENTH, EIGHTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS: NO SUCH PROOF OF A QUID PRO QUO
NECESSARY
Former City Administrator of Burton, Michigan, Charles Abbey, was convicted for
receiving bribes from Albert Louis-Blake Rizzo, a local land developer.83 The government in
this case did not introduce any evidence establishing that Rizzo and Abbey had an express
agreement for a specific official act to be performed in return for Rizzo’s gift, but it did assert
that Abbey used his influence and position to assist Rizzo with several land developments.84 The
Sixth Circuit, focusing primarily on the plain language of the statute which lacks a reference to
any requisite proof, found that a conviction under § 666 did not require a quid pro quo.85 The
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court asserted that Sun–Diamond’s heightened quid pro quo requirement for § 201 convictions is
inapplicable to both § 666 and the Hobbs Act due to the fact that they are “markedly different”
statutes.86 The district court’s jury instructions were not improper for failing to include a
requirement that the government prove a direct link from some specific payment to a promise of
some specific official act.87 According to the Sixth Circuit, the jury was only required to find
what it did, namely that Abbey accepted property with the corrupt intent to use his official
influence in Rizzo’s favor.88
A similar conclusion was reached by the Seventh Circuit when it held that the absence of
a quid pro quo would not prevent conviction under § 666.89 A jury concluded that Carl Gee
caused the Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee (“OIC”) to pay Gary
George, who at the time was the majority leader of Wisconsin’s state senate, for his assistance in
directing welfare-program-management contracts to OIC and further preventing the state from
auditing OIC’s performance.90 Gee caused OIC to pay kickbacks to George and these kickbacks
violated § 666 because OIC received more than $10,000 annually in federal grants.91 The court
held that “a quid pro quo of money for a specific legislative act is sufficient to violate the statute
but it is not necessary.”92 The court also held that a sensible jury would be able to conclude that
George had corrupt intent, which is required by the statute, and that Gee conspired with George
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to carry out a plan whereby federal money in OIC’s hands was exchanged for George’s
influence.93
In United States v. Zimmerman,94 the Eighth Circuit held that the government was not
required to prove any quid pro quo for a conviction under § 666(a)(1)(B).95 Gary Dean
Zimmerman represented the sixth ward on the Minneapolis City Council from 2002 until 2005
and was one of the six members on the council’s zoning and planning committee.96 Gary
Carlson, a real estate developer, was planning a multimillion dollar mixed-use project on the
edge of the sixth ward, and recognized that his rezoning application faced opposition due to
neighborhood resistance to additional retail in the area.97 After several meetings, Zimmerman
solicited $100,000 from Carlson for the legal bill he and other plaintiffs had incurred in an
unsuccessful challenge to an earlier redistricting plan.98
On one particular occasion, Carlson, while wearing a wire, attended a fundraiser for
Zimmerman and requested his help to lobby the planning commission members in advance for
the upcoming vote on his rezoning application and Zimmerman promptly agreed.99 More money
was exchanged between the parties regarding the rezoning plan and Zimmerman’s campaign, but
Zimmerman argued that the government presented insufficient proof that he intended a quid pro
quo in his dealings with Carlson.100 Zimmerman claimed that he could not be found guilty of
accepting payment for official actions that would have been taken regardless of whether Carlson
paid him.101 The court noted that § 666(a)(1)(B) prohibits both the acceptance of bribes and
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acceptance of gratuities intended to be a bonus for taking official action.102 Zimmerman was
indicted, convicted of, and sentenced for accepting gratuities rather than bribes, and the
government was not required to prove any quid pro quo.103 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held
that it was unnecessary to prove a quid pro quo of any kind in order to convict an individual for
receiving either gratuities or bribes under the statute.104
The Eleventh Circuit was confronted with a consolidated appeal arising from five bribery
and public corruption cases relating to the $3 billion repair and rehabilitation of a sewer and
wastewater treatment system in Jefferson County, Alabama.105 The defendants argued that their
bribery convictions under § 666 should be vacated because the indictments failed to allege that
the contractor-defendants provided specific benefits to county employees in exchange for, and
with the intent that the employees perform a specific official act.106 The Eleventh Circuit again
looked to the plain language of the statute and concluded that while the requirement of a
“corrupt’ intent in § 666 did narrow the conduct that violates the statute, it did not impose a
specific quid pro quo requirement.107 The government was required to show only what is
expressed in the statute, which does not include an intent that a specific payment was solicited,
received, or given in exchange for a specific official act (i.e., a quid pro quo).108
Without uniform interpretation or guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress, several
circuits have treated the quid pro quo requirement differently. The Fourth Circuit required proof
of an explicit quid pro quo for convictions under § 666, while the Second Circuit relaxed the
requirement and applied an implicit quid pro quo. The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Id. (noting the language of § 666(a)(1)(B) “corruptly solicits or demands…intending to be influenced or
rewarded”).
103
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Circuits, in contrast, have declined to inject a quid pro quo requirement in § 666 convictions
altogether. In light of this significant split, a standard should be recognized and implemented by
the Supreme Court in order to achieve some consistency. Otherwise, a politician in one state
may face conviction under § 666, while another politician in the next state over may not, even if
the two engage in identical conduct.109

V. AN IMPLICIT QUID PRO REQUIREMENT IS THE BEST SOLUTION
The recognition of an implicit quid pro quo requirement by the courts in § 666 is the most
effective and equitable solution in light of the current circuit split. An explicit quid pro quo
would prove too onerous a requirement for prosecution, and the lack of any quid pro quo
requirement would allow for innocent individuals to become susceptible to prosecution. Despite
the absence of any reference to a quid pro quo in the language of the statute, such a requirement
can be inferred from legislative intent. In addition to intent, it further makes sense to apply an
implicit proof because of the policy implications that would result if no such requirement
existed. Furthermore, based on its ruling in McCormick and Evans, the Supreme Court might
take a similar approach and require a quid pro quo for conviction under § 666, despite the lack of
any direct reference to one in the statutory text.
A. LIMITS OF

THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE

Section 666, on its face, does not require a quid pro quo to convict people of soliciting or
accepting bribes in relation to federal funds. The text of § 666(a)(1)(B), which applies to the
alleged recipient of a bribe, provides that an official has violated the statute when he or she
“corruptly” accepts a gift “intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any

109

Justin Weitz, Note, The Devil is in the Details: 18 U.S.C. § 666 After Skilling v. United States, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 805, 831 (2011).

18

business, transaction, or series of transactions.”110 The Supreme Court held in Sun–Diamond
that § 201, which also does not expressly require a quid pro quo, does in fact require one.111 This
could be attributable to the fact that bribery, as it is generally understood, constitutes an
exchange of one thing for another, i.e., a quid pro quo.112 One could argue that if Congress
desired to inject a quid pro quo limitation for convictions under § 666, it could have easily
written this into the statute.113 However, despite a lack of any reference to a quid pro quo, one
may be inferred simply because the essence of bribery embodies the quid pro quo.114
The Sixth Circuit distinguished § 201 from both the Hobbs Act and § 666. Neither § 666
or the Hobbs Act contains the “official act” language that the Sun–Diamond Court found
“pregnant with the requirement that some particular official act be identified and proved.”115
The Supreme Court’s statement in Sun–Diamond that bribery requires a quid pro quo, defined as
“the specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act,”116 was
made in the context of a statute that was “merely one strand of an intricate web of regulations,
both administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of gifts and other self–enriching
actions by public officials.”117 Section 666 is similar to § 201 and to the Hobbs Act in that all
fail to include any “quid pro quo” language in the statutory text. The plain language makes no
mention of any requisite tie between the business transaction and the bribe being solicited or
accepted. As discussed in Part III above, this uncertainty has led to a significant split in the
circuits over whether a quid pro quo requirement should be read into the statute, and whether
110
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reasoning analogous to that in Sun–Diamond and McCormick also justifies the injection of such a
requirement into § 666.
As a last resort doctrine, the rule of lenity may provide some direction for the courts in
their decision to require proof of a quid pro quo for convictions under § 666. “The rule of lenity
is applied when a broad construction of a criminal statute would ‘criminalize a broad range of
apparently innocent conduct.’”118 An expansive interpretation of this criminal statute would
likely result in this type of criminalization.119 It is important to have a determinative criminal
threshold that would allow for defendants to be on notice of what types of actions would
constitute a violation under the statute and allow for the statute to cover the type of criminal
behavior it was intended to reach.120 The Eleventh Circuit out right dismissed the application of
the rule of lenity to cases involving convictions under § 666.121 In McNair, the court noted that
the defendants failed to identify a “grievous ambiguity” within the statute or to show that the
statutory language criminalizes innocent behavior.122 The court reasoned that the mere
possibility of a narrower statutory construction by itself does not make the rule of lenity
applicable.123 However, interpreting and reconciling the statute “as is” has proven to be an
arduous task, and its tendency toward ambiguity requires that it be resolved in favor of lenity.124
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A strict adherence to the § 666 statutory text alone, where a quid pro quo is not expressly
required, could result in unconstitutional vagueness “because ‘[w]hat renders a statute vague
is…the indeterminacy of precisely what…fact must be established to show guilt.’”125 The
absence of a quid pro quo here leaves the question of what exactly is needed to convict an
individual under the statute completely open to interpretation by the courts and the defendant
guessing as to whether he or she is acting in violation of the law. Vagueness in the language of
the statute leaves the interpretation of the law to the discretion of individual prosecutors.126
While the text in § 666 does not recognize a quid pro quo requirement, the analysis
should not stop at the statutory text alone. In the cases of § 201 and the Hobbs Act, the Court
applied the requirement despite its absence in the text. Because the statutory language is not
clear here, we must look beyond the plain language to discern congressional intent in order to
determine what type of proof requirement is intended and most desirable.
B. AN IMPLICIT REQUIREMENT COMPORTS WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Section 666 should not be read literally and without reference to its legislative context.
In enacting § 666, Congress “merely adopt[ed] into federal statutory law a concept of crime
already so well defined in common law and statutory interpretation” that Congress’ silence on
the requirement of a quid pro quo cannot be taken to mean that none is required.127 Section 666
was enacted for a specific purpose: the prevention of corruption in federally funded programs by
nonfederal employees.128 Congress expressly intended to “augment the ability of the United
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States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal monies that are
disbursed to private organizations or State and local governments pursuant to a federal
program.”129 Congress went further to state that it “intends that the term ‘Federal program…’ be
construed broadly, consistent with the purpose of this section to protect the integrity of the vast
sums of money distributed through federal programs.”130 Therefore, the best reading of the
statute would include an implicit requirement, so that any and all corrupt dealings related to the
use of federal funds could be prosecuted, not just those in which the solicitors or recipients
expressed an explicit exchange.
Lindgren puts forth two situations that both involve corrupt takings on the part of
officials without an explicit quid pro quo:
(1) An elected judge approaches a lawyer in a major case pending
before the judge and says, “I haven’t heard from you yet. Would
you donate $100,000 to my re-election fund?”
(2) An elected legislator approaches a businessman and says, “If
you pay me $100,000 for my campaign, I can’t promise you how
I’ll vote on the many pieces of legislation affecting your company–
that would be illegal. But if you contribute, I predict that I will
vote your way.”131
A quid pro quo could be implied in these situations, but they are not explicit.132 These examples
refer to campaign contributions and would ordinarily be subject to prosecution under the Hobbs
Act. However, the same type of problem would occur concerning situations pertaining to § 666,
if, for example, bribery in connection with organizations receiving federal money was at issue
instead of campaign contributions. The line between an explicit and implicit quid pro quo may
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be unclear at times,133 but requiring proof of a specific exchange only may prevent prosecution
of otherwise corrupt or unlawful conduct.134 It was the purpose of the statute to actually expand
upon the previous federal bribery statutes in prosecuting corruption, and an explicit requirement
would effectively limit the statute’s scope.
Justice White, writing for the majority in McCormick, endorsed an explicit quid pro quo
requirement for convictions under the Hobbs Act in order to prevent legitimate transactions from
being prosecuted.135
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the
district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business
of a legislator. It is also true that campaigns must be run and
financed. Money is constantly being solicited on behalf of
candidates….Whatever ethical considerations and appearances
may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of
extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support
legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and
received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of
what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain
property from another, with his consent, “under color of official
right.”136
Without an explicit quid pro quo requirement, Justice White argued that prosecution of both
legal and unavoidable conduct, such as the exchange of legitimate campaign contributions or
passage of beneficial legislation, would ultimately result.137
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in United States v. Evans,138 provided for a less
rigorous, and therefore more encompassing quid pro quo requirement.139 The defendant’s
133
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acceptance of a bribe “constituted an implicit promise to use his official position to serve the
interests of the bribe-giver.”140 The inducement is criminal if it is either expressly stated or
implied from the words or actions of the briber.141 The Court’s justification for its departure
from the McCormick standard was that otherwise “the law’s effect could be frustrated by
knowing winks and nods.”142 Both opinions express realistic concerns regarding the effects that
each type of proof may have, but the Evans standard, as applied to § 666 cases, would comport
better with the legislative intent present here.
C. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Justice Stewart, when describing pornography, famously stated “I know it when I see
it.”143 This characterization could be applied to cases concerning bribery or theft, but the reality
remains that different courts can reach different conclusions even when presented with
essentially the same facts.144 What looks like on obvious bribe to one juror may seem like a
legitimate exchange to another. A quid pro quo requirement would eliminate the discrepancies
among the courts and make it clear to defendants, prosecutors, and juries exactly what a violation
of § 666 entails.145
The absence of a quid pro quo requirement could lead to convictions that, on their face,
would not be considered illegal transactions.146 The imposition of a quid pro quo requirement,
though it does not need to reach the level of explicitness advocated by Justice White, would at
least provide clarity as to what a prosecutor must prove under § 666 to secure a conviction and
138
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what instructions must be provided to the jury.147 The Eleventh Circuit argued that a quid pro
quo was not necessary because the language of the statute is sufficient on its own.148 However,
reliance on the corruption requirement alone is subject to ambiguity.149 A quid pro quo
requirement would provide clearer notice to defendants as compared to a simple corruption
requirement.150
Aside from affording better notice to defendants allegedly in violation of the statute, a
quid pro quo requirement would afford juries significant guidance in their decision-making.151
The Fourth Circuit therefore correctly concluded that a jury instruction regarding violations of §
666 was erroneous unless an explanation of “corrupt intent” required the jury to find a “relatively
specific” quid pro quo.152 A jury would not be required to pinpoint an explicit tradeoff or
identify a specific official act; instead, it would only have to imply from the dealings that the
parties intended to engage in an exchange.153 The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not require the
jury to find a quid pro quo, and instead relied on a simplistic reading of the statutory language.154
The district court in McNair gave a jury charge that merely repeated the language of the
statute, and the only definition of “corruptly” provided to the jury was that “[a]n act is done
‘corruptly’ if it is performed, voluntarily, deliberately, and dishonestly for the purpose of either
accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or
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lawful result by an unlawful method or means.”155 This circular definition of “corruptly” hardly
informs the jury of what it must identify.156 In contrast, instructing the jury to identify either an
implied or explicit quid pro quo would make it easier for the jury to understand the task at hand
and avoid issues of ambiguity and confusion.157
While Justice White’s concerns regarding the possibility of lawful, everyday activity
falling within the ambit of prohibited transactions have some merit, an implicit quid pro quo
requirement (as opposed to an explicit one) would prevent unlawful transactions from potentially
slipping through the cracks.158 Imposing an explicit requirement could potentially protect those
corrupt officials who are smart or careful enough to avoid making explicit transactions.159 While
certain cases may suggest that an explicitness requirement would not prove to be a significant
obstacle for prosecutors because officials often implicate themselves in relatively clear and
explicit ways,160 an implicit requirement would reach those situations where officials refrain
from making explicit exchanges. Undercover government agents and informants, such as Dwek
in the Beldini case, can purposefully render an official’s transactions conveniently explicit.161
However, subtle bribery is just as unlawful and perhaps equally, if not more so, common than
explicit bribery.162 An implicit quid pro quo would strike a balance between the concerns of
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protecting lawful behavior from prosecution and reaching those acts which would escape liability
under an explicitness requirement.
Providing a quid pro quo requirement for § 666 convictions could also yield other
practical benefits.163 Not only would judges, juries, and defendants have a similar standard to
look to as to what constitutes a violation under the statute, but a single or similar standard across
similar bribery statutes may provide for uniformity and ease of decision making.164 Questions
may still arise as to what exactly constitutes an implicit quid pro quo. However, this type of
proof requirement comports with legislative intent because it best expresses the scope of
behavior that Congress meant to criminalize. In many instances, individuals are accused of
violating several federal bribery statutes in one case. Although it is not imperative or
substantially rewarding to harmonize these statutes, it may provide an even more uniform
standard for judges, juries, and litigators to follow, thereby reducing the potential for conflicting
convictions as applied to the same facts in any given case.

VI. CONCLUSION
Section 666 is a useful tool employed by the federal government to fight public
corruption as it pertains to federal programs and funding. It is imperative that the legislature,
using the federal statutes at hand, provides an effective means in which to combat such
corruption. The proof required to convict an individual under § 666 has been debated by the
courts, and the result is an ambiguous application of the statute. Despite the absence of any
express reference to a quid pro quo in the statute, the plain language, when read in light of the
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legislative intent, dictates that parties must intend to engage in a quid pro quo in order to be
convicted under § 666. Furthermore, an implicit quid pro quo comports with legislative intent
because it would allow prosecutors to reach corrupt exchanges lacking explicitness. The Second
and Fourth Circuits aptly found jury charges lacking instruction on a quid pro quo to be
erroneous. Judges, lawyers, defendants, and juries alike would benefit from a uniform,
identifiable standard. The Supreme Court has previously applied a quid pro quo requirement to
other similar federal bribery statutes, and would thus likely require the same type of proof under
§ 666. An implicit quid pro quo requirement would decrease existing confusion of the
application of § 666 and allow for a greater accounting of public corruption for which the statute
was created to combat in the first place.
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